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THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS:
A HISTORY AND EVALUATION OF
THE FORMATIVE YEARS
I.

INTRODUCTION

"We should constitutionalize an election board, because its
services in this state are needed. Illinois needs, and must be
ready with a responsible, visible, bipartisan group of citizens to
solve the foreseeable and the not-so-foreseeable questions. . ...'
On May 14, 1970, Betty Ann Keegan, 2 a delegate to the Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention, argued that the new constitution should include a central election authority to be called the
State Board of Elections. Delegate Keegan's arguments carried
the day. The convention proposed, and the people of Illinois
adopted, the following constitutional provision:
A State Board of Elections shall have general supervision over
the administration of the registration and election laws throughout the State. The General Assembly by law shall determine
the size, manner of selection and compensation of the Board.
party shall have a majority of members of the
No political
8
Board.
This article describes how the concept of the State Board
of Elections developed prior to and during the convention. It reviews the legislative implementation of the constitutional language, analyzes court decisions regarding the Board, and considers the performance of the Board from the date of its commencement until the Illinois Supreme Court held its statutory
framework to be unconstitutional and during the period prior to
the enactment of the new State Board of Elections bill. The
article also discusses the constitutional options that remained
open to the legislature after the court decisions and then highlights the new bill signed into law on January 12, 1978.
1. 2 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGs, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
at 1056 (1969-70) (remarks of Delegate Keegan) [hereinafter cited as
PROCEEDINGS].

2. Betty Ann Southwick Keegan (1920-1974) was a delegate to the
constitutional convention from the 34th Senatorial District, comprised of
greater Rockford. Mrs. Keegan had long been active in civic and political affairs and had personally experienced the difficulties encountered by
a minority party in an area dominated by another party. From 1963 until 1969 she was a member of the Illinois Election Law Commission,
which had studied proposals for legislation creating a central state election authority. In 1972 she was elected Illinois State Senator (Dem.34th District), the position she held at the time of her death.

3. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 5.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
A. Impetus for Reform
The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention was called because most citizens were convinced that piecemeal attempts to
amend the 1870 constitution had failed and would continue to
fail. The convention assigned the task of recommending a workable amendment process and modern election provisions to the
Committee on Suffrage and Constitution Amending. While convention sentiment favored an easier amendment process, there
4
was little impetus to change the old suffrage article.
One of the reforms suggested to the convention was a statewide central election authority. During the 1960's, many observers of Illinois elections had argued that Illinois suffered from
inefficient and inconsistent local administration of elections.
Each of the 112 different local election authorities (102 county
clerks and 10 city boards of election commissioners) administered
the election laws in a different manner. To complicate matters,
the Illinois Election Code prescribed three somewhat different
sets of procedures for voter registration and election administration.5 Since each election officer had his own rules and
procedures, any consistency of practices within the state was
a consequence of informal relationships among election officials,
not the result of any statutory requirement.6
For a number of years, the Illinois Election Laws Commission, composed of legislators, election officials, and interested
members of the public, voiced its criticism of the balkanization
of election administration. 7 Prior to July 1, 1971, the effective
4.

ILL. CONST. art. VII (1870).

[Tihe suffrage article of the 1870 Constitution (Article VII) was

very general in language and in concept. It, in fact, had not been a
serious hindrance to the development of the election process. If the
process was weak or defective, it was largely a consequence of General Assembly action or inaction.
The constitutional convention presented an opportunity, not so
much to change the suffrage article, as to inject into it new mandates
intended to stimulate, and, in certain cases, to compel the General
Assembly to enact reform legislation.
A. GRATCH & V. UBIK, BALLOTS FOR CHANGE:
ING ARTICLES FOR ILLINOIS 64 (1973).

NEw SUFFRAGE AND AMEND-

5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 4-1 to 4-29, 5-1 to 5-39, 6-1 to 6-78, 13-1
to 13-16, 14-1 to 14-12, 17-1 to 17-29, and 18-1 to 18-17 (1971).

In 1970 Illinois had three different election codes, one applicable to
counties with a population under 500,000 (i.e., all but Cook County),
one applicable to counties with a population over 500,000 (i.e., Cook
County), and one applicable to municipalities that have elected to
establish a board of election commissioners.

61 n.3.
6. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 4, at 76-77. Gratch and Ubik further

GRATcH & UBIK, supra note 4, at

suggested that "[a] single administrative election authority would be in

a position to eliminate undesirable or unfair differences and to institute

good practices throughout the state." Id. at 77.
7. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1057 (remarks of Delegate Miller).
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date of the new constitution, the state's highest ranking election
authority was the State Electoral Board.8 The duties of that
body were essentially ministerial. The Electoral Board seldom
did more than receive candidates' petitions, certify to county
clerks the names of offices and candidates to appear on primary
and general election ballots, certify nominations and elections
to office, and canvass votes for state and national offices., Local
election authorities fell under the supervision of the State Electoral Board only to a very limited extent.
Unlike its predecessor, the State Board of Elections was
not intended to be a purely ministerial agency. 10 Although many
questions regarding the intent of the constitutional convention
are not easily answered, it is clear from a reading of the debates
that the convention favored a board with supervisory powers,
designed to secure by one central authority the consistent interpretation and implementation of the general election laws established by the General Assembly."
B.

History of Article III, Section 5

The first delegate officially to propose that there be a statewide central election authority was Peter A. Tomei, chairman
12
of the Committee on Suffrage and Constitution Amending.
Chairman Tomei proposed to his committee that a chief election
officer be established to administer the election laws. The committee members rejected the proposal, largely because they
feared that a negative reaction by county clerks would jeopardize
the fate of the 'entire constitution. 3 When the full convention
8. The State Electoral Board, consisting of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Auditor of Public Accounts, was responsible for
state elections until 1951, when the Attorney General and the Treasurer
joined the other three elected state officials, and the Governor was designated the chairman. In 1967 the chairmen of the state central committees of the Republican and Democratic parties were added.
9. The daily responsibility for administering these ministerial functions fell to the Index Division of the office of the Secretary of State. The
Secretary of State was secretary to the State Electoral Board. See 1971
ILL. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. S-372. But see Daly v. Stratton, 326 F.2d 340
(7th Cir. 1964) (holding that the State Electoral Board's duty to examine
nomination petitions and certify candidates for inclusion on the ballot
was not a mere ministerial power, and that the board was exercising an
executive function in refusing to certify persons).
10. See, e.g., 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1057 (remarks of Delegate Cicero), 1061 (remarks of Delegate Wenum); GRATCH & UBIK, supra
note 4, at 86.
11. See authorities cited note 10 supra.
12. For a biographical description of Chairman Tomei see GRATcH &
UBIK, supra note 4, at xv-xxii.
13. See GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 4, at 77:
Many members believed that the clerks, who wielded significant patronage power and voter influence, would see the proposal as an infringement of their local autonomy and authority. If the proposal
were included in the new constitution, these clerks might campaign
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considered the suffrage article on first reading, Chairman Tomei
renewed his proposal. He suggested that the General Assembly
appoint a single, statewide election officer and designate the officer's jurisdiction, powers, and duties. 1 4 Delegate Keegan then
offered a substitute proposal' 5 which provided for a bipartisan",
against ratification. The more conservative members did not want
to witness a shift of this electoral power away from the counties to
the state, nor did they want to risk the success of the entire constitution for the uncertain benefits to be derived from this somewhat
radical idea of the chairman's.
14. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1053-54. Chairman Tomei suggested that a central election authority's primary function should be "to
facilitate efficient and fair election procedures on the local level." Id. at
1054.
15. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1056.
16. There is some confusion over whether the convention intended to
create a nonpartisan or bipartisanboard. The pertinent language of the
proposal on first reading states simply that "no political party shall have
a majority of members of the Board." 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at
1055. However, as selected passages of the constitutional convention debates illustrate, the delegates used the two concepts almost interchangeably. Compare 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1056 (remarks of Delegate Keegan):
Illinois needs, and must be ready with a responsible, visible, bipartisan group of citizens ....
.. . We need a central election authority, bent to no particular
partisanpoint of view ....
...I strongly feel that no single Illinois official . . . can pos-

sibly serve in a nonpartisanposture in this highly partisan state, and
God bless that characteristic. Only a multiple board can offer a political balance . . . .
.I urge my fellow delegates to join Chairman Tomei in his
expression of the need for a central election authority, but to substitute for his suggestion of an individual authority, a balanced, highly
visible, bipartisan,and responsible board of elections ....
Id. (emphasis added) with 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1057 (remarks
of Delegate Cicero):
[TI here is some merit-more merit-in having regulations and so on
promulgated by a state board. It lends greater prestige to them and,
to a certain extent, removes the charges of partisanshipor unfairness.
...Neutrality in the administration of elections is particularly
important.
. . Yet too often, at the top of such system [sic], we have
vested general authority for administration in a single official who
is a member of a particular-of one or the other particular parties.
Id. (emphasis added).
In Lunding v. Walker, 65 ill. 2d 516, 526-27, 359 N.E.2d 96, 100-01
(1976), the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that in implementing the
constitutional mandate establishing the State Board of Elections, the
General Assembly sought to negate partisanship in order to guarantee
the Board's political independence. Likewise, commentators have characterized the convention's proposal as providing for a nonpartisanBoard.
See, e.g., GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 4, at 83.
In the final analysis, it is safe to say that the delegates wanted a
"neutral" Board-one free from domination by any one political party.
They attempted to accomplish this objective by prohibiting any political
party from having a majority on the Board. The delegates did contemplate that the Board would be bipartisan,in the sense that the state's two
major political parties would be equally represented, but neither this intention nor the language adopted would preclude the appointment of
members not affiliated with the two major parties. Indeed, Delegate Elward suggested this possibility in his argument in opposition to the Board
on second reading. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 3632.
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State Board of Elections responsible for general supervision of
the administration of all registration and election laws throughout the state. Recognizing the constitutional merit and political
appeal of a neutral election board, rather than a single, partisan
election officer, Chairman Tomei withdrew his proposal and
supported the Keegan proposal." 7
The convention approved the Keegan proposal on first reading by a vote of 71 to 30.18

However, some delegates thought

that the proposal should be considered by the legislature rather
than the constitutional convention. 19 Others voiced the concerns
of county clerks who feared that a central authority would infringe upon the powers of their offices and "create a very large
patronage office, which could send their particular delegates into
the particular little counties and tell them how to operate elections. ' '20 All of the delegates affiliated with the Chicago Regular
Democratic Organization voted against the proposal, 2 ' apparently
because they were apprehensive that a central election authority
Board of Election Comwould dilute the powers of the Chicago
22
Clerk.
County
Cook
the
and
missioners
Three months later, when the convention considered the
Keegan proposal on second reading, opponents of the new Board
had rallied their forces and attempted to delete the entire provision from the constitution. 23 Delegate Arthur Lennon, a Republican from Joliet, questioned the compatibility of such a board
with the concept of home rule, which had been recently adopted
by the convention for large cities and for Cook County. 24 Dele17. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1055-56.

18. Id. at 1063. Two members voted "present" and one member
voted "pass."
19. Id. at 1059 (remarks of Delegate Lennon).
20. Id. (remarks of Delegate Jaskula).
21. Id. at 1063.
22. See GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 4, at 84. For a discussion of the
convention's political factions see S. GOVE & T. KITSOS. REVISION SUCCESS:
THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 43-47 (1974); Anderson

& Lousin, From Bone Gap to Chicago: A History of the Local Government Article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 9 J. MAR. J. 698, 703-04, 709
(1976).
There were five broad political factions at the convention:
1) the Cook County Democrats, often called the "regulars" or
"Daley Democrats" because they were loyal members of the Cook

County Regular Democratic organization chaired by Mayor Daley;
2) the Independents, mostly non-Daley-organization Democrats
from Cook County;
3) the Cook County Republicans, a looser coalition whose base
was suburban:
4) the Downstate Democrats, a widely-scattered group of members who were in the minority in most areas downstate; and

5) the Downstate Republicans, an equally diverse association of
members whose party was in the majority downstate.
Id. at 709 (footnote omitted).
23. See GRATCH &UBIK, supra note 4,at 86.
24. 4 PROCEEDINGS,supra note 1, at 3632.
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gate Paul F. Elward, a principal spokesman for the Chicago
Democrats, criticized the broad, somewhat vague enabling language of the section, raising the specter of someone from other
than the two major political parties having a major voice on election law matters. 25 Proponents of the proposal emphasized the
neutral character of the Board and the benefits to be gained from
establishing machinery that would insure fairness to all political
parties and segments of the electorate and would provide for consistency of practices throughout the state. 26 A coalition composed primarily of Independents and Republicans joined to carry
2 7

the proposal.

C.

ConstitutionalIntent

The constitutional convention debates over the establishment
of the Board leave the impression that the delegates, including
the Board's proponents, had only a general idea of what they
were creating. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, they had high
2
hopes that it would be an improvement over what existed.
Delegate Elward warned the convention that the provision
was dangerously vague. He pointed out that it did little more
than give the Board a name and the power to exercise "general
supervision over the administration" of the state's election laws.
25. Id. at 3629.
26. See, e.g., 2

PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1057 (remarks of Delegate Cicero), 1059 (remarks of Delegate Butler), 1061 (remarks of Dele-

gate Wenum).

Delegates who were of the minority party in their respective areas
supported the proposed board early, because they had personally experienced difficulties in obtaining election information and assistance. Delegate Keegan remarked: "I think almost anyone who has been a candidate-unless his party takes the complete responsibility for him-at least
the first time entering the political thicket, stands in need of guidance;
and we have an uneven source of guidance and an uneven source of information . . . throughout this state. 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at
1060-61. See also Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969), discussed in note 60 infra.
27. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 3633. The final vote was 60 to 47.
On third reading, on August 28, 1970, the vote on article III was 78-33
in favor of passage with 2 members voting "pass." 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 1, at 4302.

28. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently commented in Walker
v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill.
2d 543, 559, 359 N.E.2d 113, 121 (1976)
that:
The focus of the floor debates at the 1970 Constitutional Convention,
insofar as they pertain to article III, section 5, concerned the need for
a central election authority and the relative merits of including reference to such an authority in the Constitution. Little thought appears
to have been given to the particular manner in which Board members might be chosen. The report of the Committee on Suffrage and
Constitution Amending sheds no light, as the committee voted not to
recommend inclusion of a provision for a State Board of Elections in
the Constitution. Finally, in commenting upon article III, section 5,
the authors of the explanation to the voters merely stated: "This
section is new and self-explanatory."
Id. (citations omitted).
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It neither established the size of the Board nor delineated its
29
duties.

A subsequent dialogue between Delegates Malcolm S. Kamin
and Betty Ann Keegan evidences essentially the same point:
MR. KAMIN: As I understand your answer, you have
said that there is no real vesting of sovereign power in the state
electoral board initially; but similar to the state board of education, we are creating a board with general responsibility in
the field, and it's more or less left to the legislature to fill in the
void and give them exactly their powers and duties and then,
secondly, up to them to exercise their powers and duties. Is
that correct?
MRS. KEEGAN: I think that the substance of it is correct,
80
yes.
In short, the convention delegates had aspirations for the
creation of a statewide agency to "reform" the election process
in Illinois. They left to the General Assembly such matters as
how such an agency would be set up, how it would operate, and
what powers and duties it would have. The vague constitutional mandate for the Board has sparked heated debates in the
legislature over the selection of its members, its duties, and its
"independence."8 1 It has also generated two Illinois Supreme
Court decisions on those issues,"2 as well as intense newspaper
commentary and public controversy over the Board's operations.88
The problems associated with the Board in its first years
of operation may be due as much to the politically sensitive nature of the subject matter as to faulty or vague constitutional
language. By their very nature, constitutional guidelines must
be general. The convention delegates were often inclined to vote

for broad principles of reform, the details of which they themselves could not agree upon, rather than for more specific proposals which some segment of the convention might have found
29. See 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 3630 (remarks of Delegate Elward):
I think we are kidding ourselves. We are setting up a board here.
We are not providing its number, size, duties or anything else, really.
We are just saying it shall have general supervision over the administration of the registration and election laws. And we haven't really
issued any ukase or demand as to requirements of these election laws
that they be the same for everybody.
Id.
30. 4 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 4300.
31. For a discussion of the legislature's struggle over the statutory
framework of the board see text accompanying notes 42-53 infra.
32. See Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 543, 359 N.E.2d 113
(1976); Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d 516, 359 N.E.2d 96 (1976). For a
discussion of these cases see notes 124-236 and accompanying text infra.
33. See, e.g., Springfield State Journal-Register, Feb. 22, 1976, at 1,
col. 1; Chicago Tribune, July 18, 1975, at 6, col. 2; Chicago Sun-Times,
Oct. 1, 1974, at 4, col. 3.
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unacceptable.34 Often the convention deliberately left the details
to the legislature and the courts. 3 5 In the case of the State Board
of Elections, the language compelling the General Assembly to
enact this "reform legislation," albeit with somewhat vague
guidelines, was probably the best that could have been achieved,
and, indeed, a significant achievement in itself.8 6
Although it has been suggested that it is often impossible
to discern the true intent of the delegates,3 7 it is possible to surmise the intent of the convention regarding several key aspects
of the State Board of Elections. First, the convention intended
the Board to have more than the routine ministerial functions
held by the old State Electoral Board. 38 Second, the convention
39
did not want any one political party to control the Board.
Third, it wanted the Board to insure, or at least promote, consistency, fairness, and uniformity in the implementation of regis40
tration and election laws and practices throughout the state
Fourth, the delegates intended the Board to be a part of the
41
executive branch of government.
III.

LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

FIRST STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Article III, section 5 and most of the new constitution took
effect on July 1, 1971.42 For the next two years, as the General
Assembly attempted to implement the constitutionally created
Board, the arguments raised in the convention debates were repeated and elaborated upon in both the legislature and the media.
The principal issues discussed involved the composition and
powers of the Board. Should the Board consist of four members,
34. See generally Lousin, Constitutional Intent: The Illinois Supreme Court's Use of the Record in Interpreting the 1970 Constitution,
8 J. MAR. J. 189 (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Lousin].
35. Id.

36, See GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 4, at 76: "[h]istorically, election
reform of the kind contemplated by the [Suffrage and Amending] committee's mandate has not sprung voluntarily from the General Assembly."
37. Lousin, supra note 34, at 191.
38. See, e.g., 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1057 (remarks of Dele-

gate Cicero), 1061 (remarks of Delegate Wenum); 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 1, at 4300 (remarks of Delegate Keegan).
39. See note 16 supra. The same concern has developed at the federal
level. The Federal Election Commission has become the subject of controversy as a result of President Carter's efforts to appoint an acceptable
replacement to fill a Republican vacancy on the Commission. See The
New York Times, Dec. 13, 1977, at 39, col. 1; id., April 22, 1978, at 7, col. 1.

40. See, e.g., 2 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1057 (remarks of Delegate Cicero), 1058 (remarks of Delegate Butler), 1061 (remarks of Dele-

gate Wenum); GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 4, at 83.
41. See 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 4300 (remarks of Delegate
Keegan and Delegate Kamin).
42. See ILL. CONST. adoption schedule.
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two from each major political party, or should it consist of five
persons, the fifth being an "independent"? If five, how would
the legislature choose or define an "independent"? If four, how
would party-line deadlocks be broken? Should the Board have
broad investigatory powers to seek out violations of election laws,
or should it be merely a ministerial, advisory, record-keeping
agency? Should Board members be appointed by the Governor,
by the legislature, or by other means? Should they be elected
instead of appointed?
Of course, the other two boards created by the constitution,
44
the State Board of Education 48 and the Judicial Inquiry Board,
were also controversial and difficult to implement. However, the
subject matter of the State Board of Elections went to the very
heart of the political process-the winning of elections. 4"

No

State Board of Elections bill could be anything but controversial.
One of the major problems confronting the legislature was
the constitutional prohibition against any political party having
a majority on the board. The prohibition gave rise to the concern
that if there were an even number of Republicans and Democrats
on the Board, it would frequently be deadlocked, since Board
members would probably vote along party lines on highly political issues. 46 On the other hand, if the Board had an odd number
of members, the concern was that the extra member would be a
non-party person who would rule as an "election czar" by casting
43. ILL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
44. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15.

45. Lousin, The General Assembly and the 1970 Constitution, 1
ILL. IssuEs 131, 133 (1975): "[clompared with the battle over the Board

of Elections, the creation of the Board of Education was the result of
civilized and reasonable compromise. But since winning elections is
the primary concern of politicians and political parties, the creation

of a State Board of Elections was more controversial."
46. This concern proved to be well-founded. See notes 97, 105 & 211
and accompanying text infra. The selection process finally enacted pro-

duced just such a Board. Legislative leaders were immediately criticized
for nominating persons with partisan political backgrounds. See Manning, State Board of Elections, 3 ILL. ISSUES 12 (1977). Of the eight nominees, the Governor picked Don W. Adams (Springfield), Chairman of
the Republican State Central Committee; William L. Harris (Marion),
Chairman of the Williamson County Democratic Central Committee;
Michael E. Lavelle (Chicago), assistant to Cook County Clerks Edward
Barrett and Stanley T. Kusper, Jr.; and Franklin J. Lunding, Jr. (Winnetka), active in the Republican "Operation Eagle Eye."
Illinois is not the only state whose elections board has found itself
deadlocked on highly political issues. The New York State Board of
Elections, comprised of two Republicans and two Democrats, has been
criticized for failing to act on campaign violations. That agency has
occasionally found itself unable to act due to a provision in its enabling
act that requires the vote of at least three members to pursue campaign
financing irregularities. See The New York Times, May 20, 1975.
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the deciding vote on all highly partisan issues. Generally speaking, House Republicans and independent Democrats (as well as
then Governor Ogilvie) favored the concept of an odd-numbered
Board appointed by the Governor and consisting of two Republicans, two Democrats, and an Independent. However, Regular
Democrats from both Chicago and Downstate joined the Senate
Republican leadership to oppose the inclusion of the fifth member. After much wrangling, the legislature arrived at a unique
solution: the Board would consist of four members who would,
in effect, be chosen from tle two major parties; in the event of
deadlocks, one member, chosen by lot, would abstain from
47
voting.
The second, and closely connected, major issue faced by the
legislature was that of selection and control. Neither major
party wanted the other to be able to obtain control of the state's
election machinery or to harass or embarrass the other party with
investigations. 48 When independent Democrat Daniel Walker
was elected Governor in 1972, neither Republican nor Democrat
legislators wished to give him total control over selecting the
Board. The result was another unique formula designed to check
both the Governor and the opposition parties. Each of the four
legislative leaders, the Speaker and Minority Leader in the House
and the President and Minority Leader in the Senate, would
nominate two people, and the Governor would appoint one member from each pair of nominees. 49 The statute, section 1A-3 of
the Illinois Election Code, further provided that all nominees
"shall be persons who have extensive knowledge of the election
laws of this state." 50
The General Assembly adopted this compromise, Senate Bill
1198,51 during the closing days of its spring, 1973 session and sent
it to the Governor for signature. Governor Walker vetoed the
bill,5 2 but the veto was overridden by the legislature on October
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 1A-3, 1A-7.1 (1973).
48. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 1A-3 (1973).
50. Id.
51. 2 FINAL LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIG., 571-72 (1973).
52. Governor Walker's veto letter, filed Sept. 16, 1973, said that a fifth
member of the board-a political "independent-should be appointed.
He also questioned the constitutionality of the tie-breaking procedure
and the restrictions on the Governor's power to appoint executive officers, stating that the Governor should not be limited to a restricted list
of individuals. He argued further:
Since the Board would have an even number of persons from each
party-persons certain to be highly partisan-deadlocks could be expected if there were strong efforts to change local practices considered to be unfair or discriminatory. Under the bill the most likely
result would be political compromise preserving the status quo.
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22, 1973.13 It soon became apparent, however, that the mere constitutional and statutory prescriptions of a statewide agency to
monitor the election process would not eliminate the underlying
controversy.
IV.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE BOARD'S PERFORMANCE

Pursuant to the broad constitutional mandate creating the
State Board of Elections, the General Assembly, in addition to
providing the manner of selection of Board members and the
Board's tie-breaking procedure, enacted legislation granting the
Board considerable authority. Section IA-8 of the Illinois Election Code 4 directs the Board to assume duties of both a ministerial 5 and a supervisory"6 nature, which encompass the entire

election process. In addition, the Campaign Financial Disclosure
Act confers upon the Board broad investigatory powers in the
area of campaign finance.5 7
On December 7, 1973, the State Board of Elections held its
first meeting. From the outset, the Board was faced with policy
53. 2 FINAL LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS AND DIG., 571-72 (1973).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 1A-8 (1973).
55. The Board's ministerial duties under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 1A8 (1973) included: all responsibilities previously assumed by the State
Electoral Board and the Secretary of State, id. at § 1A-8 (1); the dissemination of election information, id. at § 1A-8 (2) ; the compilation of a manual of uniform instructions for election authorities (to be prepared after
consultation with local authorities and with special provisions adapted to
the peculiar needs of the different jurisdictions), id. at § 1A-8(3); the
prescription of uniform forms, notices, and election supplies (this function would presumably prevent the type of abuses exemplified in Flamm
v. Kusper, 384 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1974) vacated and remanded without op., 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975), in which a county clerk who was
a candidate for reelection was enjoined from displaying his name on
various forms and official election day signs and posters posted at precinct polling places on the day of a general election), id. at 1A-8 (4); the
compilation of election records and statistics, id. at 1A-8(6); and the
preparation and certification of ballots for proposed referendums and
amendments to the constitution, id. at 1A-8 (5).
56. The Board's supervisory responsibilities under ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
46, § 1A-8 (1973) included: the review and inspection of all records of
the administration of election laws throughout the state, id. at § lA-8 (7);
the reporting of violations of the election laws to the State's Attorney,
id.t the adoption of all rules and regulations necessary for the performance of its duties, id. at § 1A-8(9); the recommendation of appropriate
legislation to the General Assembly, id. at § 1A-8(8); and the determination of the validity and sufficiency of petitions filed under article XIV,
§ 3 of the 1970 Constitution, id. at § 1A-8(10).
While many states and the federal government have enacted legislation regulating campaign disclosure, expenditure, and practices, and have
established separate administrative agencies to implement such legislation, relatively few agencies have supervisory powers over the actual
conduct of the elections as in Illinois. See generally FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION, HANDBOOK OF STATE ELECTION AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS (R.

Smolka ed. 1976); Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1111, 1242, 1272-73 (1975) hereinafter cited as Elections].
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 9-18 (1975)

confers upon the Board the

authority to hold investigations, administer oaths, and issue subpoenas
with respect to alleged violations of the Act.
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choices which had potentially great political impact. As a result,
many of the Board's decisions have been tested in the courts. 58
The role of the judiciary in defining the actual parameters
of the Board's authority was both inevitable and indispensable.
A.

Ballot Access

Crucial to the fair and impartial administration of election
procedures is the means by which access to and positioning of
candidates' names on election ballots is provided. The positioning of candidates' names on the Illinois ballot has generated numerous courtroom battles. 59 Historically, the Illinois Secretary
of State had great influence on ballot positioning.6" However,
recognition that a first ballot position may give a candidate a
significant advantage over candidates whose names are listed below 61 has caused state law in this area to be subjected to federal
62
equal protection guidelines.
58. In the federal courts, jurisdiction over election-related disputes is
generally premised upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3), (4) (1970). In Illinois,

election disputes may be brought in the state circuit courts in the form
of a petition for injunctive or declaratory relief or a writ of mandamus.
The Illinois Supreme Court may entertain petitions for an original writ
of mandamus under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 8-13 (1975). Certain actions
of the board under the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 46, §§ 9-1 to 9-27 (1975), are subject to review by the appellate
courts pursuant to the Administrative Review Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 246 (1975). See generally ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO ILLINOIS ELECTION LAW, ch. 3 (1976).
59. See, e.g., Baum v. Lunding, 535 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1976); Bohus
v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971); Weisberg v.
Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969); Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp. 1280
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Mann v. Powell, 314 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd,
398 U.S. 955 (1970); Bradley v. Lunding, 63 Ill. 2d 91, 344 N.E.2d 472
(1976); Huff v. State Bd. of Elections, 52 Ill. 2d 74, 309 N.E.2d 585
(1974).
60. See, e.g., Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388, 390-91 (7th Cir. 1969);
Mann v. Powell, 314 F. Supp. 677, 678-79 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 398 U.S.
955 (1970). In Weisberg, Illinois Secretary of State Paul Powell testified
that he had given personal preference to persons whom he knew in
breaking ties for first filing among candidates for the position of delegate

to the state constitutional convention. Powell further testified that his
office had arranged to receive certain candidates' petitions by special

mail delivery on the Sunday preceding the first filing date. 417 F.2d at
391 n.4. The Secretary's actions were held to violate equal protection of
the laws, and the court of appeals enjoined certification of the ballot until ties for first filing could be broken by lot and the names of the candidates listed accordingly. 417 F.2d at 394. In Mann, the court held that

breaking ties for first filing among candidates for the position of delegate

by any means other than by lot or other nondiscriminatory means violated equal protection of the laws. 314 F. Supp. at 679.
61. See Note, California Ballot Position Statutes: On Constituttional Advantage to Incumbents, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 365, 376 (1972). See
generally H. BAIN & D. HECOCK, BALLOT POSITION AND THE VOTER'S CHOICE

(1957).

See also Sangmeister v. Woodard, Nos. 77-1365, 77-1366, 76-1953

(N.D. Ill., filed Nov. 7, 1977).

62. See, e.g., Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d at 393-94; Mann v. Powell,

314 F. Supp. at 679; Sangmeister v. Woodard, Nos. 77-1365, 77-1366,
76-1953 (N.D. Ill., filed Nov. 7, 1977).
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During its first meeting, the State Board of Elections adopted,
pursuant to section 7-12 of the Illinois Election Code,6 3 a regulation which provided the ground rules for a lottery to determine ballot placement. 64 Ballot placement was to be based upon
the order in which nominating petitions were filed, and a lottery
was to be scheduled to break ties for first filing.65 The lottery
would include all petitions received by mail after midnight of
the day preceding the first date of filing and on hand when the
doors of the Secretary's office opened the following morning
and, in addition, all petitions which had been filed in person
or by a representative in line that morning when the Secretary's
doors opened.66
In a similar factual setting, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Weisberg v. Powell 67 had determined that any intentional discrimination by election officials against candidates seeking ballot placement constituted a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. Two federal district court decisions, Mann v.
Powell" and Netsch v. Lewis,69 had respectively enjoined the
certification of a candidate's position on the ballot by any means
other than by lottery or a similar non-discriminatory scheme and
invalidated an Illinois statute which allowed ballot placement to
be based upon a candidate's seniority and incumbency.
In Huff v. State Board of Elections, 70 the Illinois Supreme
Court ultimately upheld the lottery scheme as defined by the
Board's regulation. The court found that the scheme was a fair
and impartial means of determining ballot placement, because
it afforded no advantage to those candidates who filed their petitions by mail rather than in person. The court also held that
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-12(6) (1975), provides that:
[t]he State Board of Elections and the various clerks with whom
such petitions for nominations are filed shall specify the place where
filings shall be made and upon receipt shall endorse thereon the day
and hour on which each petition was filed. Petitions filed by mail
and received after midnight and on hand upon the opening of the office involved, shall be deemed as filed as of 8:00 a.m. of that day or
as of the normal opening hour of such day, as the case may be, and
all petitions received thereafter shall be deemed as filed in the order
of actual receipt. Where 2 or more petitions are received simultaneously, the State Board of Elections or the various clerks with whom
such petitions are filed. shall break ties and determine the order of
filing, and such determination shall be conclusive.
64. See Huff v. State Bd. of Elections, 57 Ill. 2d 74, 77-78, 309 N.E.2d
585, 587 (1974).
65. Id. at 78, 309 N.E.2d at 587.
66. Id.
67. 417 F.2d 388, 393-94 (7th Cir. 1969). See note 60 supra.
68. 314 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 398 U.S. 955 (1970). See
note 60 supra.
69. 344 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
70. 57 Ill. 2d at 78-79, 309 N.E.2d at 587,
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the regulation was a valid interpretation of the legislative intent
underlying section 7-12 of the Election Code. 71
In 1975, the Board again became involved in a dispute concerning a Board regulation related to the lottery to break ties
for first filing. The regulation in question provided that group
nominating petitions could be filed and could compete against
individual petitions in the lottery. 72 The effect of a group petition being drawn first in the lottery was to place the names of
those candidates who were members of the group first and the
names of the individual candidates below according to the order
the lots were drawn. 78
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Bradley v. Lunding,74 held
that individual candidates were not purposefully discriminated
against since the scheme could increase the odds that an individual would be drawn first, depending on the number of group
and individual petitions filed. The court reasoned that since the
regulation was necessarily drawn in advance of filing, and before
the number of group and individual petitions that would be filed
simultaneously could possibly be determined, any unfair result
75
could not be due to intentional and purposeful discrimination.
The argument that a group position on the ballot could make
the group's endorsers readily identifiable did not raise an equal
protection problem in light of the overriding interest of the voter
in readily identifying the candidates for whom he wishes to
vote.7 6 The Bradley decision was followed by the Seventh CirT
cuit Court of Appeals in Baum v. Lunding."
Equal protection guidelines have also been applied to the
procedure for qualifying for a position on the ballot. In every
state, minor parties and independent candidates face greater
hardships in obtaining ballot placement than major parties and
incumbents.7 8 Although some legitimate state interest may be
present in restricting ballot access to those candidates who are
able to demonstrate a certain level of popular support,79 the
means by which a state effects this goal have been subject to
constitutional limitations.8 0
71. Id.
72. Bradley v. Lunding, 6311. 2d 91, 94, 309 N.E.2d 474 (1975).
73. See Baum v. Lunding, 535 F.2d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 1976).
74. 63 Ill. 2d at 97-98. 309 N.E.2d at 476.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 98, 309 N.E.2d at 476.
77. 535 F.2d 1016, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1976).
78. See Elections, supra note 56, at 1123.
79. Id. at 1141.
80. See, e.g., American Party v. White 415 US 767 (1974); Stover v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). See generaily Elections, supra note 56, at
1130-51.
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In 1974, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois invalidated a ruling by the State Board of Elections which
had rejected nominating petitions submitted by the Communist
Party.8 l The Board had applied a statutory requirement that any
political party seeking statewide ballot placement must submit
petitions containing not less than 25,000 signatures of qualified
voters with not more than 13,000 signatures from any one
county.8 2 Yet, that very statutory requirement had been declared
unconstitutional two years earlier in Communist Party v. Ogilvie,88 which in turn had followed the United States Supreme
s4
Court's decision in Moore v. Ogilvie.

The Board argued on appeal that the statutory requirement
was necessary to fulfill the legitimate state objective that "multifarious political associations with little or no support do not bemuse the electoral process. 8 5 However, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the provision violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, because it discriminated against residents of populous counties in favor of residents
of sparsely populated counties, upsetting the one man-one vote
86
basis of our representative government.
The burden placed upon the Communist Party by the application of this unconstitutional statute evidences the potential for
harassment by an agency such as the State Board of Elections,
even though convention delegates sought to avoid the potential
for harassment by the creation of a neutral Board.8 7 Although
a minor party may rely on the courts to safeguard its constitutional rights, the inference may be drawn that a purely bipartisan
Board is more likely to safeguard only the rights of the two
major parties represented on the Board.
In Williams v. Butler,s8 a state appellate court upheld a pro81. See Communist Party v. State Bd. of Elections, 518 F.2d 517, 51819 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1976).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-2 (1973).
83. 357 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1972).

84. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). Moore invalidated ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, §
10-3 (1967), which required that candidates submit nominating petitions
containing at least 25,000 signatures of qualified electors 200 of which
were required to come from each of at least 50 counties. For a discussion
of minimum signature requirements for independent candidates and new
political parties in the context of citywide elections, see Socialist Workers Party v. Chicago Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 433 F. Supp. 11 (N.D.
Ill.), af 'd sub nom. Socialist Workers Party v. Illinois State Bd. of
Elections, 566 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1248
(U.S. Mar. 9 1978).
85. 518 F.2d at 519.
86. Id. at 520. The discriminatory effect lies in the dilution of voting
strength in the populous counties.
87. See notes 16 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
88. 35 Ill. App. 3d 532, 341 N.E.2d 394 (1976). Douglas L. Butler, a
private citizen, challenged Dakin William's petitions before the State
Board of Elections pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 10-9 (1975), which
authorized the Board to hear and pass on objections to the nomination
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vision of section 10-4 of the Election Code which requires that
circulators of nominating petitions submit a notarized statement
to the effect that they personally circulated the petitions and
that the signatures on the petition were signed in their presence
and are genuine. This provision was held to be a valid requirement relating to the preservation of the integrity of the election
process and not a mere technicality.8 9 However, a Board ruling
that the misnumbering of the pages of a nominating petition constituted a valid ground for refusing to certify a candidate's name
for the ballot was overruled. 90 Such a technical requirement in
no way relates to the integrity of the election process.
The scope of the Board's authority to determine the validity
and sufficiency of petitions to place constitutional amendments
on the ballot, under section 1A-8(10) of the Election Code, came
into question in Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board
of Elections."' A controversy ensued when the Board sua sponte
undertook the determination of the validity and sufficiency of
petitions to place a proposed constitutional amendment on the
ballot.9 2 Since no objection to the petitions had been filed, proponents of the amendment contended that the Board's action
violated their federal constitutional rights.93 Subsequently, this
issue became moot when the Illinois Supreme Court struck down
the petitions on the ground that the substance of the proposed
amendments went beyond the scope of article XIV, section 3
of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, which permits initiative amendments to the legislative article only if they are "limited to the
structural and procedural subjects. '94 The court also stated
that "the determination of whether a proposed amendment meets
the Constitution's requirements is a question for the courts, not
for an agency. ' 95 Thus, the Board's power under section
1A-8 (10) is apparently limited to determinations going to the
form rather than the substance of such petitions.
of candidates for state office, The Board had stricken Williams' name
from the ballot because his petitions were out of numerical sequence due

to the omission of a page 191 out of 323 pages, because certain petitions
had been improperly notarized, and because certain signatures had been

challenged as forgeries. 35 Ill. App. 3d at 534-35, 341 N.E.2d at 396.
89. Id. at 536, 341 N.E.2d at 397-98.
90. Id. at 535, 341 N.E.2d at 397.
91. 65 Ill. 2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 138 (1976).
92. Although ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 28-1.2 (1975), requires that the
Board shall hear and pass on objections to petitions for submission of
questions of public policy to the electorate just as under ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 46, §§ 10-8 to 10-10.1, which apply to nominating petitions, no objection was timely filed in this instance.
93. Complaint, Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 76-0096 (S.D. Ill., filed Aug. 4, 1976).
94. 65 Ill. 2d at 472, 359 N.E.2d at 147. This action was filed subsequent to the federal court action, note 93 supra, by a group of concerned
citizens seeking to prevent the board from spending tax dollars to investigate the petitions. The Coalition intervened as a defendant.
95. Id. at 463, 359 N.E.2d at 143.
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B.

The Conduct of Elections

The first significant dispute over the conduct of elections
which involved the Board stemmed from its decision to structure elections to fill judicial vacancies on a "head-to-head" basis
rather than on a "field" basis. A field contest pits all candidates
for all judicial vacancies against each other in one contest with
those candidates receiving the greatest number of votes being
declared elected. However, a head-to-head contest pits against
'each other only those candidates who are seeking to fill a specific
vacancy and requires a separate contest for each vacancy to be
filled. 96
The issue of how to structure the judicial election was decided by lottery because Republican and Democratic Board members split along party lines. 97 The Board's ruling was subsequently challenged by a candidate in Johnson v. State Board of Elections,98 in which the Illinois Supreme Court ultimately upheld
the Board's decision. The court's decision was based upon the
lack of any definitive action on the matter by the legislature9 9
and the fact that 90 percent of all nominating petitions had been
filed prior to the Board's first meeting, on the basis of instructions issued by the Secretary of State which had indicated that
the contests would be held on a head-to-head basis. 10 0
Another Board regulation was challenged in Zavala v. Lunding,10 1 in which the Circuit Court of Sangamon County invalidated a Board regulation concerning section 7-34 of the Election
Code, which provides that candidates may appoint poll-watchers
for each precinct. 0 2 Section 7-34 states that pollwatchers may
serve in 'any precinct or ward in the county in which they reside.
The pollwatcher is not required to live in the township or
municipality in which he is a pollwatcher unless a candidate has
two watchers, and then only one of the watchers must reside
in the precinct or ward. The Board's regulation required, in
effect, that both pollwatchers be registered in the town or municipality where they wish to be pollwatchers. One effect of such
96. See Johnson v. State Bd. of Elections, 57 Ill. 2d 205, 206, 311 N.E.
2d 123 (1974).

97. The Board's Democratic members supported the head-to-head
method while the Republican members pushed for the field method. A
Republican member drew the short straw, and the issue was decided in
the Democrats' favor.
98. 57 Ill. 2d 205, 311 N.E.2d 123 (1974).
99. Id. at 213, 311 N.E.2d at 126. Under ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12, the
Illinois General Assembly is to provide by law the requirements for
nominating petitions in elections to fill judicial vacancies.
100. 57 Ill. 2d at 213, 311 N.E.2d at 127.
101. No. 138-77 (7th Cir. Ill., filed March 24, 1977).
102. ILL. REv. SrAT. ch. 46, § 7-34 (1973).
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a regulation would be to prevent suburban residents from serving as pollwatchers in Chicago. The court held that although
the Board has rule-making authority, it has no authority to issue
rules and regulations which are contrary to the election statutes.
C.

Campaign Finance and Economic Interests

The Board has been involved in several controversies over
its performance in relation to the Governmental Ethics Act' 0 3
and the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act. 104 The major issues
encountered have been in determining who must file disclosure
statements under the respective acts and in how the board should
conduct hearings on alleged non-compliance with statutory requirements.
On September 27, 1974, the Board narrowly construed the
reach of the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act when, after again
resorting to a tie-breaking lottery, it adopted rules' 0 5 narrowly
defining what constitutes a "political committee" and is therefore
subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act. 106 As interpreted by the Board, only those political committees which endorsed specific candidates by name were required to make financial disclosures. 07 This interpretation would allow most political
committees to avoid disclosure requirements simply by collecting
contributions before endorsing specific candidates.
The Board's action was subjected to judicial scrutiny in
People ex rel. Scott v. Lavelle. 08 The circuit court invalidated
the Board's rules after finding that they were in conflict with
the very sections of the Election Code which they purported to
implement. 0 9 The Board's argument that the criminal nature
103. ILL. REv.

STAT. ch. 127, §§ 601-101 to 608-101 (1975).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 9-1 to 9-27 (1975).
105. The "provisional rules and regulations" referred to here are set
forth in People ex rel. Scott v. Lavelle, No. 547-74 (7th Cir. Ill., filed

Oct. 15, 1975). In adopting the rules, the Board was forced to resort to

its tie-breaking lottery after again deadlocking along party lines, and a
Republican member lost the drawing.
106. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 9-1.7, 9-1.8, 9-1.9 (1975) define "local political committee", "state political committee", and "political committee"
respectively. The disclosure requirements of the Act are set out in ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 9-3, 9-10 (1975).
107. See People ex rel. Scott v. Lavelle, No. 547-74, slip op. (7th Cir.
Ill., filed Oct. 15, 1975).
108. Id.
109. See note 105 and accompanying text supra. The court reasoned
that:

[t]he rule provides an exclusion that is not mentioned in the Statute
and in effect completely abolishes campaign disclosure. Sections 91.7(a) and (b), 9-1.8(a) and (b) and 9-1.9 of the Act specifically
mention the words candidate or candidates and questions of public
policy but the addition of the word particular before candidate or
candidates or question of public policy constitutes a Rule in direct
conflict with the Act ....
A declaration of the court finding the

340 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11:321
of the Act required its narrow construction was met by the circuit court's assertion that any constitutional defect stemming
from the overbreadth of the Act should be corrected by the legislature, not the Board. 110 The extent of the Board's authority to
promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the implementation of the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act is, therefore,
limited by the Act itself."'
A similar controversy over interpretation resulted from the
Board's ruling that, under section 604A-105 of the Governmental
Ethics Act, 1 2 certain nonincumbent candidates who had filed
statements of economic interest along with their nominating petitions were required to file such statements again after winning
nomination in the March, 1974 primary or be stricken from the
November, 1974 general election ballot. This followed from an
earlier Board determination that nominees for elective office held
a "position" under the Act, which required that a new statement
of economic interest be filed every April 30.11 The Board's ruling could have had the effect of barring from the ballot the
names of several hundred nonincumbent nominees for various
state and local government offices." 4 In People ex rel. Downs
v. Adams, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the April 30 filing
date applied only to persons holding positions of employment
falling within the Act on that date, that a nominee for an elective
office did not hold such a position, and that candidates were required only to file their statements no later than the date by
which a candidate must have taken all action necessary to qualify
for nomination, election, or retention of such office." 5
The Board's function under the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act was again the subject of litigation when its narrow
interpretation of the Act made it practically impossible for a comrules valid would be tantamount to stating that the General Assem-

bly in passing and the Governor in approving Public Act 78-1183 had
no purpose nor logic.
People ex rel. Scott v. Lavelle, No. 547-74, slip op. at 3.
110. People ex rel. Scott v. Lavelle, No. 547-74, slip op. at 2.
111. Id. at 3.
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-105 (1975). The Board is required,
under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-12(8) (1975), to consider whether candidates who have filed nominating petitions have complied with the requirements of the Illinois Governmental Ethics Act.
113. ILL. REv. 'STAT. ch. 127, § 604A-105 (1975), provides in relevant
part:
On April 30 of each year after 1972 a statement must be filed by each

person whose position at that time subjects him to the filing requirements of Section 4A-101 unless he has already filed a statement in
relation to the same unit of government in that calendar year.
Id. (emohasis added).
114. People ex rel. Downs v. Adams, 59 Ill. 2d 178, 179, 319 N.E.2d 465,
466 (1974).
115. Id. at 183, 319 N.E.2d at 468.
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plainant to establish "justifiable grounds" for holding a public
hearing on his complaint. Under the Act, the Board is to hold
a closed preliminary hearing on all complaints. At the hearing,
a complainant, without the aid of subpoena power, must demonstrate that the complaint was filed on "justifiable grounds" 116
and that a public hearing on the matter should be held. After
such a showing has been made, subpoena power is authorized. 117
However, the definition of "justifiable grounds" appears neither
in the Act nor in the Board's provisional rules and regulations.
In the fall of 1975, the Better Government Association
(BGA) "'8 brought a complaint before the Board alleging that two
organizations of Cook County Democrats" 9 had failed to file statutorily required statements. 1 20 In a closed preliminary hearing,
the Board found that the BGA's evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate "justifiable grounds," and a public hearing with use
of subpoena powers was denied. 12 The BGA appealed from the
Board's ruling and, relying on the legislative history of the Act,
argued that "[a] showing of justifiable grounds for the filing of
a complaint is the equivalent of a showing that there is some
'reasonable basis' for it; it is a standard designed to weed out
scurrilous complaints.'

1 22

Before the court could act, the Illinois

Supreme Court handed down its decision in Walker v. State
116. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 9-21 (1975).
117. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 9-18 (1975). The provisional rules and
regulations of the State Board of Elections do not provide for any discovery prior to the granting of an order for a public hearing. See Provisional Rules and Regulations of the State Board of Elections, Rules 17.0317.05 (1975).
118. The BGA is a not-for-profit, private citizens' organization with
the avowed purpose of discovering, disclosing, and thereby inhibiting
corruption and inefficiency in government. See Pensoneau, Government
Reform: BGA's Controversial Crusade, 2 ILL. IssuEs 7 (1976). The
BGA's co-complainant was William L. Hood, Jr.
119. The two organizations charged in the complaint were the Democratic Party of Chicago and Cook County and the Democratic Organization of Cook County, Inc.
120. The complaint alleged that the defendants had failed to file statements of organization required by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 9-3 (1975) and
annual reports of contributions and expenditures required by ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 46, § 9-10 (1975). See Memo. Op. of Hearing Examiner, No.
C75-8-20-1 C.D. (order filed Sept. 5, 1975) [hereinafter cited Memo.

Op.].
121. The Board explained that "[t]o loosely apply the statute to entities which do not meet all of the internal requirements for filing might

unfairly subject innocent persons to criminal prosecution and place the
Board in the untenable position of having initiated those criminal prosecutions." Memo op., supra note 120, at 10. This argument is similar to
the one made by the Board in People ex rel. Scott v. Lavelle, No. 54774, slip op. at 2, in which the Sangamon County Circuit Court struck
down an attempt by the Board to adopt rules narrowly interpreting the
disclosure and filing requirements of the Campaign Finance Disclosure
Act. See notes 108-10 and accompaning text supra.
122. Brief for Appellants, Better Gov t Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections,

No. 62610, at 25 (1st Dist. Ill., filed Sept. 10, 1975).
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Board of Elections,12 and, consequently, the appellate court dis-

missed the BGA appeal, leaving the issues unresolved.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the Board could do
little in its early years without ending up in court. The courts
necessarily played an active role in defining the permissible
limits of the Board's authority, and the resort to the courts has
been especially significant to minor parties and independent
candidates who are not represented on the Board. In any event,
the nature of the Board's duties dictates that litigation will arise

again as additional questions surface. The following section of
this article will review the two major decisions of the Illinois

Supreme Court regarding the Board-decisions which went
beyond questions of the validity of the Board's ministerial and
supervisory functions to the constitutionality of the agency and
the offices held by its members.
V.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE BOARD'S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE EXECuTIvE BRANCH

A. Lunding v. WalkerLimits on the Governor's Removal Power
In May, 1975, Franklin J. Lunding, Jr., was formally notified
that he was being removed from the State Board of Elections
for failing to comply with Governor Walker's 1973 executive
order requiring officers of the executive branch to file economic
disclosure documents with the State Board of Ethics. 124 The
legal and political issues involved went to the heart of the
Board's operation and illustrate the dilemmas faced by both
the constitutional convention and the legislature in structuring the Board. The most critical issue presented was whether
the Governor's power to remove officers of the executive branch
extended to members of the Board.
The Illinois Supreme Court had previously upheld the
Governor's right to order state officers to file financial reports
123. 65 Ill. 2d 453, 359 N.E.2d 113 (1976) (holding that the selection
procedure under which acting Board members had been appointed was

unconstitutional).

Although both the BGA and the respondents felt that

the decision in Walker prevented the Board from proceeding on comp laints filed under the Campaign Financial Disclosure Act, the Board
took the view that that decision had no effect on the BGA's appeal. After considering the views of all parties, the appellate court dismissed the

appeal. Better Gov't Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 62610 (1st Dist.
Ill., filed Jan. 31, 1977) (order of dismissal). See notes 214-22 and accompanying text infra.

124. Exec. Order No. 4-73. See Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d 516, 359
N.E.2d 96 (1977).
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with the Board of Ethics. 1 25 Governor Walker contended that
Lunding's failure to file constituted "neglect of duty." According to article V, section 10 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970,
"[t]he Governor may remove for incompetence, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office any officer who may be appointed by
the Governor." This provision had already been interpreted by
the courts as giving the Governor extremely broad removal
power over his appointees. 1 2 6 Governor Walker contended that,
because he appointed members of the Board, he could dismiss
them also. Lunding's response was that the Governor did not
"appoint" State Board of Elections members in the same sense
that he appoints his own cabinet officers; under the statute
creating the Board, the Governor's authority was limited to
the selection of four Board members from a list submitted to
him by the House and Senate leaders of both parties, in the
hope that this sharing of responsibility for the selection of
Board members between the executive and legislative branches
would keep the Board independent. Lunding further argued that
in the absence of any statutory provision for the removal of Board
members, the legislature intended impeachment to be the only
method for their removal.
1.

The September, 1975 Decision

Lunding obtained an order restraining Governor Walker
from carrying out his removal order, but on September 26, 1975,
the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously vacated the order. 27 The
court, relying on both federal and state court precedent, upheld
the Governor's virtually absolute power to remove any officer
whom he has appointed. 128 The Lunding case presented two issues for decision. The first issue, whether the Governor's removal power extended to members of the Board, was decided in
the affirmative; the second issue, whether the exercise of the
power must meet such state and federal due process requirements
as prior notice, a hearing, and an opportunity for judicial review,
1 29
was decided in the negative.
In reaching its decision on the first issue, the court relied
on Wilcox v. People ex rel. Lipe."30 Wilcox, an 1878 decision,
125. Illinois State Employees Assn. v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d 512, 517-18,
315 N.E.2d 9, 12-13 (1974).
126. See, e.g., Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003, 1007-08, 1010 n.1 (7th
Cir., 1974). See also Wilcox v. People ex rel. Lipe, 90 Ill. 186, 197, 20205, 207 (1878) (construing similar provision in the 1870 constitution).
127. Lunding v. Walker, No. 47607, slip op. at 12 (ll. S. Ct., filed Sept.
26, 1975).
128. Id. at 7-8.
129. Id. at 3, 7-8, 12.
130. 90 Ill. 186 (1878).
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considered the scope of the Governor's power of removal under
section 12 of article V of the 1870 constitution, which provided
that "[t]he Governor shall have power to remove any officer
whom he may appoint, in case of incompetency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office. . . ." In Wilcox, the court held that
the constitutional language plainly gave the Governor the power
to remove any officer whom he might have appointed and that
no room for construction existed.' 8 ' In Lunding, the court reviewed the 1970 constitutional convention debates and concluded
that the delegates were fully aware of the nonreviewable, summary power of removal held to have been vested in the Governor
by the language of the 1870 constitution.18 2 Based upon that
conclusion, the court found that the delegates deliberately chose
to retain that removal power in the new constitution.I8 8
The due process issue was decided after an extensive discussion of the concepts of "property" and "liberty" under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 18 4 The
court concluded that no protected "property" or "liberty" interest
existed in any position filled by gubernatorial appointment, 83
reasoning that, since the framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
left room for the establishment of other means of selection of
Board members, the Governor's removal power was unrestricted
8 6
by due process requirements.
2.

Rehearing-November, 1976-FinalDecision

Two days before the Illinois Supreme Court decision in
Lunding, a circuit court had declared the statutory method of
selecting members of the Board unconstitutional in Walker v.
State Board of Elections.'1 7 That decision was immediately appealed to the supreme court. On November 22, 1975, the court
granted Lunding a new hearing to consider his argument that
the Board, being a creature of the legislature, was not subject
to the Governor's control, a point that was obviously related to
the court's deliberations in Walker v. State Board of Elections
and would have to be decided consistently with its ultimate decision in that case.
On November 15, 1976, almost one year after it had issued
an order staying its decree "pending clarification" in Lunding
v. Walker, the supreme court reversed its initial decision and af131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 197.
Lunding v. Walker, No. 47607, slip op. at 4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 9-12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
No. 364-75 (7th Cir. Ill., filed Sept. 24, 1975).
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firmed the circuit court holding which had reinstated Lunding. 88s
The court held that because of the unique character of the office
held by Lunding, the Governor could remove him only for cause.
The court further held that the determination of the adequacy
3 9
of cause for removal was judicially reviewable.1
Although it had relied on Wilcox in the first Lunding decision, upon reconsideration the court found that a closer reading
of Wilcox raised doubts about the actual breadth of the holding
in that case. 140 The court cited Ramsay v. Van Meter 1 4 1 and certain language from the Wilcox decision 1 42 as support for its con-

clusion that the Governor's removal power was limited by the
scope of his power to appoint. 148 In reaching this conclusion,
the court considered persuasive analogous federal decisions inter144
preting the President's removal power.
Noting that several exceptions had been carved out of the
President's summary power of removal since Wilcox was decided, 1 45 the court distinguished "ordinary" departments within
the executive branch itself, over which the President has complete removal power, from "independent" agencies, whose mem138. Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d 516, 359 N.E.2d 96 (1976).
139. Id. at 518-19, 359 N.E.2d at 97.
140. Id. at 520, 359 N.E.2d at 97-98.
141. 300 Ill. 193, 133 N.E. 193 (1921) (dealing with the validity of the
Governor's removal of the public administrator of Cook County): "[iit
was the intention of the framers of the Constitution of 1870 to adopt the
rule which had been established under the Constitution of the United
States ... that the power of removal... was incident to and coextensive
with his [the President's] power of appointment." Id. at 201-02, 133
N.E. at 196.
142. 90 Ill. at 198:
[w]e think the intention was to adopt the rule which had become
established under the Constitution of the United States with respect
to appointments made by the President, but was denied in this State
in the case of Field v. The People, 2 Scam. 79, arising under the constitution of 1818, namely, that the constitution of 1870 makes the
power of removal from office by the Governor co-extensive with his
power of appointment.
Id.
143. Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d at 521, 359 N.E.2d at 98:
[Tihe true holding of Wilcox was not that the Governor's removal power was unlimited and unbridled, but that it was "inci-

dent to and co-extensive with his power to appoint." And in de-

termining the extent of the power, it was clear that the courts
in both Wilcox and Ramsay had found supreme court interpretations of the President's removal power to be analogous and persuasive.
Id. (emphasis added).
144. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (holding that the
President's summary power of removal does not extend to members of
the War Claims Commission, whose quasi-judicial function requires absolute freedom from executive interference); Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that members of the Federal
Trade Commission were not subject to the President's summary removal
power due to its nonpartisan, independent nature); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (establishing an "illimitable" Presidential
power to remove all appointees except federal judges).
145. Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d at 521, 359 N.E.2d at 98.
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bers were insulated from unfettered removal. 146 Special em1 47
phasis was placed on Humphrey's Executor v. United States,'
in which the Supreme Coutrt held that the President's removal
power did not extend to members of a federal agency which was
required by the nature of its duties to be a "nonpartisan com148
mission ... free from executive control.'
The Lunding court's reason for reviewing the federal decisions was that it had indicated in both Wilcox and Ramsay that
it was disposed to follow the federal rule. The court found that
the facts in several federal cases regarding "independent" agencies' 49 made the holdings of those cases particularly persuasive,
even though they were admittedly not directly on point. 150 However, the distinguishing feature of the Lunding case is that, unlike
the federal cases which involved "independent" federal agencies
established as such by Congress, the State Board of Elections
was mandated by the Illinois constitution. There are only vague
references to the Board's "independence" in the convention debates,' 5 ' and, indeed, the debates clearly indicate that the Board
5 2
was intended to be a part of the executive branch.
The Lunding court turned to the convention debates for
further consideration of the extent of the Governor's removal
power and noted that an unsuccessful attempt had been made
to delete "for proper cause" from the section conferring the removal power on the Governor. The proponent of the deletion
contended that the court decisions which had upheld summary
dismissal powers made the phrase superfluous. 155 The court concluded that the convention had retained "for proper cause" to
indicate that the Governor's removal power should not be ab54
solute in all cases.1
The court also concluded that careful reading of the convention transcripts indicated that the delegates contemplated a
"highly independent board,"' 55 and that in implementing the constitutional mandate, the General Assembly "sought to negate
146. Id. at 521-25, 359 N.E.2d at 98-100.
147. 295 U.S. 602, 624-28 (1935). See note 144 supra.
148. Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d at 522-23, 359 N.E.2d at 98-99 (emphasis added).
149. See note 144 supra.
150. 65 Ill. 2d at 524-25, 359 N.E.2d at 99-100.
151. See, e.g., 2 PROCEEDINGS supra note 1, at 1056 (remarks of Delegate Keegan), 1057 (remarks of Delegate Cicero).
152. 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 4300 (remarks of Delegate Keegan
and Delegate Kamin). In Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 543,
562, 359 N.E.2d 113, 122 (1976), the court held that members of the State
Board of Elections are officers of the executive branch.
153. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 1325.
154. 65 Ill. 2d at 526, 359 N.E.2d at 100.

155. Id.
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partisanship as much as possible and to guarantee the board's
independence." 56 This statement is particularly perplexing considering the background of the nominees for the Board. 151
Nevertheless, the court summarized the rationale for its decision
as follows:
It is plain that the legislators intended, and the public interest
demands, that Board members not be amenable to political influence or discipline in the discharge of their official duties. To
subject a neutral, bi-partisan and independent board to the unbridled whim of the Governor under the Wilcox rule would
destroy its purpose and its efficacy. . . . If the holding of this
court in Wilcox were extended and applied to the removal of the
state board of elections, the political independence of that body
envisioned by the delegates to the constitutional convention and
sought to be achieved by the legislature would be jeopardized.
We therefore hold that the Governor can only remove a member of the State Board of Elections for cause. 158
The cause of Lunding's removal was, according to Governor
Walker, Lunding's "neglect of duty" in failing to file a financial
disclosure statement. The court held that the adequacy of the
grounds for his removal was properly reviewable by the judiciary. 59 However, since the question presented at that time was
the propriety of the circuit court's issuance of a temporary injunction, the supreme court did not consider the sufficiency of
the cause cited by the Governor in his letter of removal. 16 0
3.

The Dissent

Chief Justice Underwood, author of the majority's slip opinion in the first Lunding decision, dissented from the majority's
reversal on rehearing. He found no indication in the convention
transcripts that the Governor's removal power was intended
to be judicially reviewable or that the Governor's power should
be any less absolute than Wilcox had held it to be.' 6' He also
attached less significance to the language of the delegates urging
62
an independent, bipartisan Board.'
As pointed out by Chief Justice Underwood, the rationale
given by the court for its decision seems to be strained. Although the opinion was couched in terms of limitation, 168 it went
156. Id. at 527, 359 N.E.2d at 101.

157. See note 46 supra. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 46, § 1A-13 (1975), prohib-

its political activity by Board employees.
158. 65 Ill. 2d at 527, 359 N.E.2d at 101.
159. Id. at 529, 359 N.E.2d at 102.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 533-37, 359 N.E.2d at 103-06 (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 538, 359 N.E.2d at 106-07.
163. Id. at 518-19, 529, 359 N.E.2d at 97, 102 (majority opinion) (emphasis added): "[We hold that in this particular instance, because of
the unique character of the office held by plaintiff, the Governor could
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against all seemingly applicable precedent, at least precedent involving other state agencies, and may have fundamentally
changed the meaning of article V, section 10 of the 1970 constitution. The Lunding court veered away from past decisions in
this area, basing its opinion on federal precedent not directly
on point and on general debate language stressing the need for
a bipartisan, independent agency. In Walker v. State Board of
Elections, the court referred to the fact that neither the constitutional language nor the debates made clear the intent of the
drafters regarding this Board.8 4 Yet, in Lunding, the debates
were found to be clear enough to set new precedent regarding
the Governor's removal power-presumably for this Board alone,
but arguably for any board or agency referred to either in the
constitutional convention or legislative debates as having a need
for "independence" or "bipartisanship" or "freedom from political
interference."
One factor to which the Lunding opinion did not refer but
which may not have gone unnoticed by the majority is that the
legislature, in a joint resolution, had expressed its intent that
the State Board of Elections not be a part of the executive
branch.1 65 Perhaps also the presence of the four legislative
leaders as amici curiae on Lunding's behalf had an effect on the
court's decision. Regardless of the reason, the Lunding decision
is important, if somewhat unsettling, not only for this Board, but
possibly for other state agencies.
B.

Walker v. State Board of Elections:
The Board Is Declared Invalid

1. Circuit Court Ruling-September, 1975
As mentioned before, two days prior to the initial Illinois
Supreme Court decision in Lunding, the Sangamon County Circuit Court declared unconstitutional the statutory method of
selecting members of the Board. 66 The decision came in an action brought by Governor Walker and the All-Illinois Democratic
Committee after the Board had scheduled a hearing on a complaint of the Better Government Association alleging that Walker
and the committee had not complied with the Campaign Finance
Disclosure Act. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
only remove plaintiff for cause. Further, we hold that the determination
of the adequacy of the cause for removal is, in this case, judicially reviewable."
164. 65 Ill. 2d 543, 559, 359 N.E.2d 113, 121 (1976).
165. S.J. Res. 41, 79th Gen. Assembly (1976).
166. Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 364-75, memo. op. (7th Cir.
Ill., filed Sept. 24, 1975).
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that section 1A-3 of the Illinois Election Code, 167 regarding the
appointment of Board members, violated article V, section 9(a)
of the Illinois constitution, which prohibits legislative appointments to the executive branch. The plaintiffs also contended
that the Board's tie-breaking procedure, authorized by section 1A7.1 of the Election Code, 168 violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions
as well as article III, section 5 of the Illinois constitution, which
prohibits any party from having a majority of the membership
of the Board.
On September 24, 1975, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion stating that the provision of the Election Code
providing for selection of Board members from a list of nominees
chosen by the legislative leaders "contravenes the constitutional
prohibition against appointment of executive officers by the General Assembly."' 69 The court also determined that the "tiebreaker" provision of the Election Code violated due process because "any decision which involves individual rights may not be
based on a flip of the coin or by lot.

o1

70

In granting relief, the circuit court held that the Campaign
Finance Disclosure Act remained in full force, but that the Board
could perform only ministerial duties under the Act "until this
cause becomes final and until the legislature has had a reasonable
time to act."' 7' In early October, 1975, a decree and order were
'entered pursuant to the memorandum opinion. The defendants
filed a notice of appeal with the Illinois Supreme Court, and the
circuit court issued an order staying its decree and order with
certain exceptions relating principally to proceedings on the BGA
complaint. Because of the serious impact of its order, the circuit
court suggested that the parties seek an expedited appeal to the
supreme court.
2.

The Supreme Court Decision-November,1976

On December 17, 1975, the supreme court granted the plaintiffs' motion for an expedited schedule, and the parties awaited
the anticipated "early decision" by that court. Approximately
eleven months later, the supreme court handed down its decision
affirming the circuit court ruling that both the statutory method
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 1A-3 (1973).
Id. at 1A-7.1.
Walker v. State Bd.of Elections, No. 364-75, memo. op. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 14.
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used to select Board members and the tie-breaker provision were
72

unconstitutional.1

The primary issue in Walker was the validity of the appointment section of the Election Code. 178 The Board contended that
the manner of selecting its members did not violate the constitutional proscription of legislative appointments, 174 because the
General Assembly as a whole did not participate in the selection
process. The court relied on King v. Lindberg175 for the proposition that the prohibitions of section 9(a) applied with equal
force to indirect appointments by the General Assembly through
76
its legislative leaders.1
The Board also argued that the participation of the legislative
leaders in the selection process did not constitute an "appointment" of Board members within the meaning of article V, section 9(a) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, since the legislative
leaders only selected permissible appointees from whom the
Governor made the actual appointment. 177 The court responded
that, while technically the Governor retained the power to appoint Board members, that power was so limited by the statutory scheme that the legislative leaders did participate substantially in the de facto exercise of the appointive power. 178
Ironically, the General Assembly had itself provided the court
with support for this holding by its passage of Senate Joint Resolution 41 on May 27, 1975.179 This resolution declared that it was
the "clear intent" of the General Assembly that the power "to appoint" given to the Governor under the Election Code was limited
to a "selection" between two appointees of each respective leader
172. Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 543, 359 N.E.2d 113

(1976).

REV. STAT. ch.
174. ILL. CONST. art. V,

173. ILL.

46, § 1A-3 (1975).
§ 9(a) provides:

The Governor shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a majority of the members elected concurring
by record vote, shall appoint all officers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for. Any nomination not acted upon
by the Senate within 60 session days after the receipt thereof shall
be deemed to have received the advice and consent of the Senate.
The General Assembly shall have no power to elect or appoint officers of the Executive Branch.

Id. (emphasis added).

175. 63 Ill. 2d 159, 345 N.E.2d 474 (1976) (holding that members of the
interim state fair board are officers of the executive branch subject to the
constitutional prohibition of legislative appointments).
176. Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, 65 Ill. 2d at 555, 359 N.E.2d at
119.
177. Id.

178. Id.
179. S.J. Res. 41, 79th Gen. Assembly (1975): "Resolved, That it is
. the clear intent of the Illinois General Assembly that the power

given under Public Act 78-918 to the Governor to 'appoint' was limited
in fact to a selection between 2 appointees by each respective leader of
the General Assembly. . .

."

Id. (emphasis added).
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of the General Assembly. 80 The lawmakers apparently felt that
this ex post facto explanation would impress upon the courts the
intended independent nature of this agency and its members, as
the resolution also declared that the Board was neither part of
nor subject to the executive branch.' 8 ' However, the supreme
court in Walker relied on the resolution as evidence of a violation of the constitutional prohibition against legislative appoint8 2
ment of executive officers.
The Board further argued that even if section 9 (a) of article
V 18 3 contains a general prohibition of legislative appointments
of executive officers, article III, section 5184 creates a specific
exception to that rule in the case of the State Board of Elections."8 5 It pointed out that article III, section 5 states, in pertinent part: "[t]he General Assembly by law shall determine
the size, manner of selection, and compensation of the Board."
The Board argued that if separate parts of a constitution appear
to be in conflict, courts should favor a construction which will
render every provision operative. 8 6 It also contended that a
specific constitutional provision should prevail over a general section if the two are incompatible.'8 7 Both contentions are standard canons of interpretation.' 88
The court, however, relied upon the report of the 1970
Constitutional Convention Committee on the Executive, which
stated that section 9(a) "carries forward existing language
which would block any effort at legislative selection of an officer
in the executive branch."' 1 9 The court also concluded that no
language in the convention debates indicated that article III,
section 5 was intended to be an exception to the limits on the
legislature's power to appoint. 19 0 The court acknowledged that
if the terms of the statute establishing the method for choosing
members of the Board had been incorporated into section 5 of
article III itself, it would have regarded that section as creating
an exception to the general rule against legislative appointments
of executive officers.' 9 ' As it was drafted, however, article III,
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 65 Ill. 2d at 556, 359 N.E. 2d at 119: "[w]e hold that section (a)
is applicable to this case, notwithstanding the Governor's retention of at
least nominal power to appoint Board members."
183. See note 174 supra.
184. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 5.
185. 65 Ill. 2d at 556, 359 N.E.2d at 119.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis, 49 Ill. 2d 476, 274 N.E.2d
87 (1971); People ex rel. Nauert v. Smith, 327 Ill. 11, 158 N.E. 418 (1927).
189. 65 Ill. 2d at 559, 359 N.E.2d at 121.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 556-57, 359 N.E.2d at 119.
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section 5 specified no particular method of selection and therefore could not be considered a specific exception to the general
proscription of article V, section 9 (a). Indeed, the court found
that even if an inconsistency did exist, the proscription of section 9 (a) had to be accorded primacy. 192 The court held that
article III, section 5 imposed upon the General Assembly the
responsibility for determining the manner by which Board members were to be selected; but, although section 5 gives the General Assembly wide discretion, the manner of selection of Board
members is limited by the specific prohibition of legislative ap19 3
pointments to the executive branch.
Besides invalidating the appointment section of the Election
Code, the court also held that the provision for the unusual and
194
controversial tie-breaking procedure was unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs had advanced two principal contentions in this regard: (1) that the tie-breaking provision violated due process
of law because it caused decisions concerning fundamental rights
to be made by lot or by chance in some cases; and (2) that it
contravened the mandate of article III, section 5 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution that "no political party shall have a majority
of members of the board."' 195
The court agreed that the tie-breaking scheme did cause decisions to be made on an arbitrary basis. The court found that
the arbitrary character of the scheme was underscored by the
statutory prohibition of reconsideration by the board of any vote
or policy determined pursuant to the tie-breaker for a period of
nine months, except by unanimous vote. 196 In invalidating the
tie-breaking provision, the court relied upon previous decisions
regarding the application of due process safeguards to administrative hearings before governmental entities. 197 Those cases had
held that "[a]dministrative proceedings are 'governed by the
192. Id. at 557, 359 N.E.2d at 120:

Applying the same rules of construction utilized by defendants, we
note that article III, Section 5, imposes upon the General Assembly
the responsibility for determining the manner by which Board members are to be selected. Section 5 thus recognizes in the General Assembly a wide discretion to choose an appropriate method of selection. To be measured against this general recognition of authority,
nevertheless, is the specific prohibition against legislative appointment found in section 9 (a). It follows that, if we are to give logical
effect to both provisions, we must treat article V, section 9 (a), as a
limitation upon the otherwise broad authority recognized in the General Assembly by article III, section 5.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 565, 359 N.E.2d at 123-24.
195. Id. at 563, 359 N.E.2d at 122-23.
196. Id. at 564, 359 N.E.2d at 123.
197. Ellis v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 44 Ill. 2d 438, 255 N.E.2d 417
(1970); Brown v. Air Pollution Control Bd., 37 Ill. 2d 450, 227 N.E.2d 754
(1967); Smith v. Dep't of Regis. and Educ., 412 Ill. 332, 106 N.E.2d 722
(1952); People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934).
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fundamental principles and requirements of due process of
law,' "198 that "It]he object of this constitutional safeguard is to
preserve the personal and property rights of any person against
the arbitrary action of public officials,"'19 9 and that "[d]ue process
presupposes a fair and impartial hearing before a fair and
impartial tribunal."2 00
Chief Justice Underwood dissented from the court's invalidation of the tie-breaker. He took exception to the majority's suggestion that a fifth "independent" member be appointed as a
means of avoiding deadlocks:
Assuming that individuals of reasonable intelligence exist who
are truly "independent," who have been so unconcerned with
the qualifications of their public officials and the functioning
of their government as to have never voted in any primary election or supported one or the other of the major political parties,
the General Assembly might well have thought the public interest best served by leaving to chance the resolution of deadlocked issues rather than to the vote of so politically sterile an
201
individual.
3.

The Effect of the Walker Decision

As a result of the Walker decision, the Board was, in effect,
"legally dead." However, the court stayed the effect of its judgment in order to "allow sufficient opportunity for legislative response.'20 2 The principal effect of the ruling was that the legislature would have to try again to fulfill the mandate of the 1970
constitution that a strong, independent board be established to
20 3
run the state's election machinery.
The supreme court in Walker thus recognized the General
Assembly's "great discretion to provide methods of selection
other than gubernatorial appointment," as well as deciding that
the Board and its members are "officers of the executive branch"
within the meaning of article V, section 9(a). While it gave no
specific examples of how the legislature could exercise its discretion, it did make it clear that the legislative leaders could not
appoint themselves to the Board,204 and that the General As198. Ellis v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 44 Ill. 2d 438, 446, 255 N.E.2d
417, 422 (1970); Brown v. Air Pollution Control Bd., 37 Ill. 2d 450, 454, 227
N.E.2d 754, 756 (1967).
199. People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 147, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934).
200. Smith v. Dep't of Regis. and Educ., 412 Ill. 332, 341, 106 N.E.
2d at 722, 726 (1952).
201. 65 Ill. 2d at 567, 359 N.E.2d at 124 (Underwood, C. J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 565, 359 N.E.2d at 124 (majority opinion). When the legislature had not responded by March 15, 1977, the Court granted a series
of stays effective until May 11, 1977, June 30, 1977, November 30, 1977,
January 13 1977 and July 1, 1978, respectively.
203. Chicago baily Law Bull., Nov. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
204. 65 Ill. 2d at 560, 358 N.E.2d at 121.
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sembly could not confer appointive power upon private individuals and organizations. 20 5 The court stressed that, in addition
to those officers listed in the Illinois constitution as executive
officers of the state, 206 there were other officers in the executive
20 7
branch of government.
Under the Walker decision, the legislature could provide that
the Governor is to appoint members of the State Board of Elections. If the legislature decided to structure the appointment
procedure in this fashion, it presumably would not be bound by
the language of article V, section 9(a), which provides that "the
Governor shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, a majority of the members elected concurring by
elective vote, shall appoint all officers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for." In other words, since the
court has made it clear that the constitution has "otherwise provided for" a State Board of Elections within the meaning of section 9(a), the language requiring the advice and consent of a
majority of the Senate would not operate; likewise the language
in the same section providing that "[a]ny nomination not acted
on by the Senate within 60 session days after the receipt thereof
shall be deemed to have received the advice and consent of the
Senate" would not operate. The remaining portion of that section, forbidding the legislative appointment of executive officers,
would continue to operate. 20 8 The legislature could merely require gubernatorial appointment of the Board without the advice
and consent of the Senate, or it could require advice and consent
to gubernatorial appointments by either a simple or extraordinary majority of the Senate, the House, or both.
In the alternative, the legislature could provide that any
other officer of the executive branch, or a combination of officers,
could appoint Board members, with or without confirmation by
the respective houses of the General Assembly. However, article
V, sections 17 and 18, listing the duties of the Comptroller and
Treasurer, respectively, do not contain language permitting those
officers to "perform other duties that may be prescribed by law,"
whereas article V, sections 14, 15, and 16, respectively describing
the duties of the Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, and
Secretary of State, do contain such language. It might follow,
then, that the Treasurer and Comptroller could not constitutionally be given the power to appoint members to the Board.
205. Id.
206. Those officers listed in the constitution as executive officers are
the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of
State, Comptroller, and Treasurer. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1.
207. 65 Ill. 2d at 560-61, 359 N.E.2d at 120.
208. Id. at 558-59, 359 N.E.2d at 120.
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Neither the constitution nor the supreme court has set any
restriction on the number of members who could be appointed,
other than that "no political party shall have a majority of members of the board. ' 20 9 The legislature could, therefore, provide
for the appointment of an even number of members with no tiebreaker scheme, in effect forcing the members to agree among
themselves or to have their disagreements decided by the
courts. 210 A member of a third political party could be appointed, providing an uneven number of board members, or, notwithstanding the dissent of Chief Justice Underwood, the legislature could provide for the appointment of someone affiliated
with no major political party. It could define "affiliation" in
the statute, or simply leave it open for determination on an ad
hoc basis. 211 The constitutional language would allow ties to be
broken neither by the vote of the governor nor by any other
officer of the executive branch, since such a tie-breaker would
certainly contravene the prohibition against any political party
having a majority on the Board, 212 nor would it allow for appoint213
ment or nomination by political party officials.
The effect of the Walker decision on the actual operations
of the Board was left somewhat unclear. The Sangamon County
Circuit Court, on September 24, 1975, issued a declaratory judgment limiting the Board to "ministerial" as opposed to "investigative" and "quasi-judicial" functions. 21 4 A notice of appeal was
filed, and the trial court granted a stay which permitted the
209. ILL. CONST. art. III, § 5.

210. A study by the Illinois Legislative Council of thirteen state
boards and commissions with various degrees of authority over the conduct of elections in their respective states indicates that of those thirteen
states, only New York, Rhode Island, and Illinois have an even number
of voting members. The study does not include the Wisconsin Board of
Elections, which is comprised of eight members. "State Boards of Elections in Selected States," Illinois Legislative Council memo., No. 9-686,
April 20, 1976. For a comprehensive overview of other state agencies
relating to elections see generally FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, HANDBOOK OF STATE ELECTION AGENCIES

AND

OFFICIALS (R. Smolka ed. 1976).

211. For further discussion on this point see Bernardini, State Board

of Elections, 3 ILL. IssuEs 15 (1977). An odd-numbered board, containing one member affiliated with neither major party, could have prevented
such difficulties as the Board's month-long inability to agree on a new
chairman in 1976, the arguably arbitrary decision on the major question
of how elections for judicial vacancies would be structured in early 1974,
and the split over political committee financial disclosure requirements
in September, 1974. However, the prospect of an independent on the
Board has so far been politically unpalatable, as each political party is
apparently convinced that an independent would side with the other
party.
212. See 65 Ill. 2d at 564-65, 359 N.E.2d at 123.
213. See People ex rel. Rudman v. Rini, 64 Ill. 2d 321, 356 N.E.2d 4
(1976); People v. Kramer, 328 Ill. 512 (1928); Lasher v. People, 183 Ill.
226, 55 N.E. 663 (1889).
214. Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 364-75, at 14 (7th Cir. Ill.,
filed Sept. 24, 1975).
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Board to exercise all of its functions except for hearing the complaint before it against the plaintiffs in the Walker case, pending
the appeal. The supreme court decision reversed that portion of
the trial court decision which allowed the Board members to stay
in office until the General Assembly could act.215 The supreme
court, however, permitted the same practical result, by staying
the effect of its judgment "to allow sufficient opportunity for
216
legislative response.
The court affirmed the trial court order in all other respects,
including that provision of the order stating that "the board may
not act under the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act where its
acts are investigative or quasi-judicial, rather than ministerial. '' 217 The question then arose as to whether the supreme court
stay prevented the Board from acting in an investigative or quasijudicial function under the Act. The Board took the position that
it was not so hindered, 218 and, in fact, it conducted several investigations and hearings during 1976 and 1977 under that Act. However, the two court decisions which touched on this issue in 1977
indicated that the Board did not have the authority to enforce
the Act by conducting investigations, holding hearings, or issuing
findings.2 19 Although the Board continued to conduct such investigations, it is clear that a party threatened with such an
enforcement action by the Board could raise the same constitutional issues as did the defendants in Walker.
A further result of Walker was the apparent inability to fill
vacancies on the board until new legislation was enacted, an issue
that arose when a Board member submitted his resignation, effective January 12, 1977.220 Speaker of the House William Redmond
submitted the names of two nominees to Governor Thompson
on January 19, 1977, and asked him to select one to fill the vacancy. 221 Governor Thompson, citing Walker, responded that
215. 65 Ill. 2d at 565, 359 N.E.2d at 124.
216. Id.
217. Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 364-75, at 14-15 (7th Cir. Ill.,
filed Sept. 24, 1975).
218. See, e.g., Better Gov't Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 62610
(1st Dist., Ill., filed Jan. 31, 1977) (order of dismissal).
219. Id.; Reid v, State Board of Elections, mem. op., at 5 (N.D. Ill.,
Feb. 11, 1977) (action filed by a campaign committee of the Illinois
Socialist Workers Party and one of its candidates challenging the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act was dismissed as moot on the ground that
Walker rendered the Board illegally composed and powerless to enforce
the Act).
220. Board member William Harris was appointed to fill the legislative vacancy which occurred when Rep. Clyde Choate (Dem.-Anna)
resigned after being elected in the 59th legislative district in November
of 1976.
221. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 46, § 1A-5 (1975), authorizes such appointments
to fill vacancies. The nominees were Jerry Corbett of Hardin and John
Gianulis of Andalusia.
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vacancies could not be filled by him in the absence of remedial
legislation.2 22 Thus, from January 12, 1977, to July 1, 1978, the
Board has operated with only three members, in violation of
the constitutional prohibition against one political party having
a majority of the members.
C. The Import of the Walker and Lunding Decisions
Although Lunding dealt with issues entirely separate from
those in Walker, the cases are similar in two respects. First,
when read together, they establish the Board as a very special
twig on the executive branch of state government. When
it ruled that the General Assembly could not appoint Board members because they are part of the executive branch, the court
declared that the Board performed an executive function and was
really part of that governmental branch. However, when it refused to allow the Governor to remove a Board member without
a showing of "cause," the court declared that the Board must
be "neutral, bi-partisan and independent." The Board is thus an
executive agency, the powers and functions of which are protected and governed by the constitution, as are those of the several elected state officers. Neither the Governor nor the Attorney General nor any other governmental office can infringe upon
the constitutionally-protected powers and duties of the Board,
just as the Board cannot infringe upon theirs.
Second, the cases furnish a unique illustration of the canon
of construction that a constitution must be read as a whole to
give each section or article full effect. 228 In Lunding the court

held that the broad mandate in article V, section 9 (a), giving the
Governor the power to remove officers he appointed, was limited
by the exception inherent in article III, section 5, creating a
"highly independent" State Board of Elections. In Walker the
court held that the broad mandate in article III, section 5, giving
the legislature the power to determine the method of selecting
members of the Board, was limited by the exception in article V,
section 9 (a), prohibiting the legislature from appointing officers
of the executive branch.
This canon was also recently employed by the court in
2 2 4 In Briceland, the EnvironPeople ex rel. Scott v. Briceland.
222. Letter of Feb. 15, 1977.
223. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wellman v. Washburn, 410 Ill. 322, 102
N.E.2d 124 (1951); People ex rel. Nauert v. Smith, 327 Ill. 11, 158 N.E.
418 (1927); Reed v. People ex rel. Hunt, 125 Ill. 592, 18 N.E. 295 (1888);
Wilcox v. People ex rel. Lipe, 90 Ill. 186 (1878).
224. 65 Ill. 2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976), noted in 11 J. MAR. J.441

(1977-78).
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mental protection Agency contended that the environment
article 225 provided a broad general mandate to protect the environment, a mandate the state had implemented in the Environmental Protection Act. The court ruled that even a statute implementing a constitutional provision must comply with other
parts of the constitution, 2 6 such as the provision delineating the
powers of the Attorney General.
In short, the Board has all the powers and protections inherent in the departments of the executive branch, including protection from encroachment by the legislature or by other executive
officers and departments. The General Assembly must remember that the State Board of Elections is created by article III,
section 5, but that its powers and duties are defined by many
other sections of the constitution, including article V, section
9 (a). Indeed, article III itself limits the Board's powers. For
example, no State Board of Elections could redefine voting
qualifications, 221 or abrogate the right to free and equal elections,228 since both subjects are covered in other sections of
article III. Because the constitution specifically grants the General Assembly the power-and also the responsibility-to define
"permanent residence for voting purposes" and to protect other
safeguards of elections, the Board could not usurp that power. 229
It is likewise doubtful that the legislature could delegate that
power to the Board, which is an administrative or executive
body, not a law-making one.
Other articles of the constitution limit and protect the
powers and duties of the Board as well. Certainly no statute
granting the Board powers and duties may contravene the due
process and equal protection clauses of the state constitution. 23 0
Since the Board may not infringe upon the Attorney General's
power as "the legal officer" of the state, it must turn to that
office for legal representation. 23 ' Although the Board could be
empowered by statute to make quasi-judicial determinations in
its hearings, it cannot encroach upon "the judicial power" vested
in the courts.232 Since the Board clearly uses public funds,
its budget must be submitted by the Governor, 23 3 its funds
225. ILL. CONST. art. XI.
226. 65 Ill. 2d at 501-02, 359 N.E.2d at 157.
227. ILL. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.

228. Id. § 3.
229. Id. § 4.
230. Id. art. I, § 2.
231. Id. art. V, § 15.

Cf. People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland, 65 Ill.
2d 485, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976).
232. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

233. Id. art. VIII, § 2(a).
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must be appropriated by the General Assembly, 23 4 and its obligation, receipt, and use of funds must be audited by the Auditor
General. 28 5 In fact, one section of the constitution specifically
requires all members of the Board to file statements of economic
interest. 2 6 No statute enacted by the General Assembly or
order issued by the Governor could ever contradict these restrictions upon, or protections of, the Board's powers and duties. The
chief lesson to be learned from Lunding and Walker may be that
the Board is not only a creature of article III, section 5, but of the
entire constitution as well.
VI.

THE NEW STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

The 1975 courtroom developments, combined with the controversies of the previous two years of the Board's existence,
prompted new demands for legislative action in the fall of 1975.237
To some observers, particularly those who had supported the concept of a strong and effective Board since before the constitutional convention, the 1975 decisions in Lunding and Walker appeared to offer a chance to start anew. 238 However, a special
legislative session which convened in the spring of 1976 for the
purpose of responding to those decisions adjourned sine die without passing any legislation on June 3, 1976.239
The Illinois Supreme Court rendered its ultimate decisions
in Lunding and Walker on November 15, 1976. Since the effect
of the Walker decision was to invalidate the Board as then constituted, the court granted a series of stays of that judgment,
extending over a period of twenty months. 240 As judicial patience wore thin, the General Assembly convened for a second
special session on October 24, 1977, and again the net result was
24 1
failure to reconstitute the Board.
234. Id. § 2(b).
235. Id. § 3.

236. Id. art. XIII, § 2.
237. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, Oct. 1, 1975, at 8, col. 4; Chicago SunTimes, Sept. 26 1975, at 6, col. 3.
238. See authorities cited note 237 supra.
239. S.B.1 (Dougherty) was passed by the Senate and was referred to
the Rules Committee in the House, which never took a vote on it; S.B.2
(Netsch) was never called for a vote on third reading in the Senate; H.B.
1-7 (Kempiners) were voted "Do Pass" by the House Elections Committee. They were subsequently tabled and the sponsor was defeated in a

motion to remove them from the table. H.B. 8 (Collins) was defeated
in the House Elections Committee.

240. See note 202 supra.
241. On November 23, 1977, the General Assembly passed and sent
to the Governor a bill providing for an eight member board and splitting appointment power between the Governor and the highest ranking
executive officer of the political party whose nominee for Governor in
the most recent general election had received the second greatest num-

ber of votes. H.B. 26 (Redmond-Dem., Bensenville), 1st Special Sess.,
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Finally, 'on January 11, 1978, the legislature, in a spirit of
compromise generated by the rapidly approaching expiration of
the last stay of the Walker judgment, passed a bill creating an
eight member Board which was signed into law by Governor
Thompson the following day, with an effective date of July 1,
1978.242
The new Board is to be composed of four members
residing within Cook County and four residents of Illinois residing outside of Cook County.2 48 The Governor shall appoint
four members from his own political party and four from a
list of twelve nominees, three for each vacancy, to be submitted
by the highest ranking executive officer of the party whose
nominee for Governor in the most recent general election received the second largest number of votes. 244 This provision
presumably avoids the constitutional prohibition of legislative appointments of executive officers involved in Walker.

The new legislation further provides that the Governor may
initially reject the out party's list of nominees in whole or
in part; however, the second list is final. 24 5 Also, in the event that
there is no elected officer of the out party eligible to make
nominations, the Governor will appoint all eight members, subject to confirmation of the Senate by an extraordinary two-thirds
80th Gen. Assembly (1977), as amended, December 3, 1977. Governor
Thompson issued an amendatory veto of the bill, complaining that the
proposed appointment procedure was a "mischievous dilution of the executive power of the Governor." Amendatory Veto Letter (Dec. 3,
1977). The legislature did not override the Governor's veto nor was it
willing to accept the Governor's amendments.
Another stay of the Walker judgment was granted in the end of
November, 1977. Walker v. State Bd. of Elections, No. 47981 (Ill. S. Ct.,
filed Nov. 31, 1977). For the first time in the series of stays granted, one
of the justices dissented. Justice Ryan predicted that the January :13,
1978, deadline would not be met. He stated:
The order of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois should carry
with it the force and effect of finality and should be accepted by the
other branches of government as being final and binding. I find it
hard to understand how something can be held invalid and yet continue in effect simply because the legislative branch of our government fails to perform its constitutional duties.
Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
242. H.B. 2271 (Kempiners, Rep., Joliet) 80th Gen. Assembly (1978).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 1A-2 (1978), as amended. Once again the supreme court extended the stay of the Walker decision, this time until
July 1, 1978.
243. Of the four members from each area, two are to be chosen from
the same political party with which the Governor is affiliated, and two
are to be chosen from the political party whose nominee for Governor received the second greatest number of votes in the most recent general
election. Id.
244. Id. § 1A-3(1) to (7). The executive officers who may submit
nominations are ranked in the following order of preference: Attorney
General, Secretary of State, Comptroller, and Treasurer. Id. § 1A-3
(2). Four members of the new Board will serve one year terms, and four
will serve three year terms. Subsequent members will serve for four
years. See note 255 infra.
245. Id. § 1A-3(3).
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vote.246 The confirmation provision assures a final check by the
out party against appointments which it finds objectionable.
In contrast to the former law, the new law provides no tiebreaking procedure and thereby avoids the constitutional dilemma presented by the old lottery system. However, the enlarged
number of Board members makes the prospect of deadlocks
less likely than before. The prospect of a purely partisan split
on highly political issues may also be lessened by the provision
prohibiting Board members from holding political party offices
247
and from running for public office.

Additional "reforms" included in the bill reflect the recommendations of early observers of the Board.2

lower salaries for Board

members, 249

48

These include

prescription of an executive

director, 25 0 restrictions on outside consultants, 251 and the return

of Board employees to the jurisdiction of the State Personnel
Code.

252

VII. CONCLUSION

During the constitutional convention debates on the State
Board of Elections, Delegate Robert L. Butler offered the following argument in support of the Board and in opposition to a motion to delete the provision:
I think-and I have long felt that Babe Ruth wouldn't have set
any home run records if he hadn't taken the bat and gone to the
plate to swing it-I think if we don't defeat the motion to delete,
we will be doing the same as taking the bat out of Babe Ruth's
hands. I think there is an opportunity to do some good here,
at the risk of doing little, if any, harm. I think it 253
would be
a tragic mistake if we knocked this one out of the park.

Viewing in retrospect Delegate Butler's allusions, one is tempted
to reflect on the fact that the Babe set records for strikeouts
as well as home runs. Unfortunately, Delegate Butler apparently chose not to remind his fellow delegates of those less optimistic statistics. In any event, in the parlance of Delegate
Butler, the Illinois Supreme Court decisions in Lunding and
Walker resulted in "a brand new ball game" for the Illinois State
Board of Elections.
The leading study of the development of the suffrage and
246. Id. §§ 1A-3(4), 1A-4. All other appointees are subject to confirmation by a three-fifths vote of the Senate. Id.
247. Id. § 1A-14.
248. See Bernardini, State Board of Elections, 3 ILL. ISSUES 15 (1977).
249. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, § 1A-6.1 (1978), as amended.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. § 1A-9.
Id.
Id. § 1A-12.
4 PROcEEDINGS, supra note 1, at 3631.
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amending article at the constitutional convention concludes with
the following observation:
The State Board of Elections, mandated by section 5 of Article III, may prove to be the most significant idea for good government advanced by the suffrage article. Many of the shortcomings of the election system involved procedure. A forthright
and aggressive State Board of Elections could do much to open
the election process and establish consistent and uniform practices throughout the state. It could neutralize the election
machinery so that it does not work to the advantage of any
particular group or political party. The Board of Elections
represents a threat to the established order. No one knows what
it will be. Of course, the unknowns are not something that will
25 4
go away or resolve themselves with time.
Since that writing in 1973, the "threat to the established order"
has been kept in check, primarily because the selection process
has resulted in the appointment of persons with close ties to, and
interests in, that established order. The potential remains, nevertheless, for the Board to do the things that it was originally intended to do: to open up the election process and to establish
consistent and uniform election practices throughout the state.
With appropriate statutory changes and with the appointment of
people who will provide the necessary leadership, the goals
255
of Delegate Keegan and Chairman Tomei may yet be achieved.

254. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 4, at 99.
255. On March 31, 1978, as this article went to print, Governor Thompson announced his appointees to the new Board: John W. Countryman
(Rep.-DeKalb); Richard A. Cowan (Rep.-Arlington Heights); John J.
Lanigan (Rep.-Palos Hills); J. Phil Gilbert (Rep.-Carbondale); Michael
E. Lavelle (Dem.-Chicago); Theresa Petrone (Dem.-Chicago); Carolyn
Chamberlain (Dem.-Springfield); Joshua Johnson (Dem.-Madison).

